Abstract-To date, as one of the most popular online social networks (OSNs), Twitter is paying its dues as more and more spammers set their sights on this microblogging site. Twitter spammers can achieve their malicious goals such as sending spam, spreading malware, hosting botnet command and control (C&C) channels, and launching other underground illicit activities. Due to the significance and indispensability of detecting and suspending those spam accounts, many researchers along with the engineers at Twitter Inc. have devoted themselves to keeping Twitter as spam-free online communities. Most of the existing studies utilize machine learning techniques to detect Twitter spammers. "While the priest climbs a post, the devil climbs ten." Twitter spammers are evolving to evade existing detection features. In this paper, we first make a comprehensive and empirical analysis of the evasion tactics utilized by Twitter spammers. We further design several new detection features to detect more Twitter spammers. In addition, to deeply understand the effectiveness and difficulties of using machine learning features to detect spammers, we analyze the robustness of 24 detection features that are commonly utilized in the literature as well as our proposed ones. Through our experiments, we show that our new designed features are much more effective to be used to detect (even evasive) Twitter spammers. According to our evaluation, while keeping an even lower false positive rate, the detection rate using our new feature set is also significantly higher than that of existing work. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first empirical study and evaluation of the effect of evasion tactics utilized by Twitter spammers and is a valuable supplement to this line of research.
than 190 million Twitter accounts, tweeting 65 million times a day [2] . Spammers have utilized Twitter as a new platform to achieve their malicious goals such as sending spam [3] , spreading malware [4] , hosting botnet command and control (C&C) channels [5] , and performing other illicit activities [6] . All these malicious behaviors may cause significant economic loss to our society and even threaten national security. In August of 2009, nearly 11 percent of all Twitter posts were spam [7] . In May of 2009, many innocent users' accounts on Twitter were hacked to spread advertisements [3] . In February of 2010, thousands of Twitter users, such as the Press Complaints Commission and the BBC correspondent Nick Higham, have seen their accounts hijacked after a viral phishing attack [6] .
Many researchers along with engineers from Twitter have devoted themselves to keep Twitter as a spam-free online community. They have attempted to protect legitimate users from useless advertisements, pornographic messages or links to phishing or malicious websites. For example, Twitter has published their definitions of spam accounts and The Twitter Rules [8] to protect its users from spam and abuse. Any account engaging in the abnormal activities is subject to temporary or even permanent suspension by Twitter. Meanwhile, many existing research studies, such as [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , also utilize machine learning techniques to detect Twitter spammers.
"While the priest climbs a post, the devil climbs ten." This proverb illustrates the struggle between security researchers and their adversaries-spammers in this case. The arms race nature between the attackers and defenders leads Twitter spammers to evolve or utilize tools to evade existing detection features [14] . For example, Twitter spammers can evade existing detection features by purchasing followers [15] or using tools to automatically post tweets with the same meaning but different words [16] . This phenomenon has also been observed and discussed by other researchers. For example, Song et al., observed that spammers tend to use different words with similar semantic meanings to evade detection [17] . Such a phenomenon motivates us to design new and more robust features to detect Twitter spammers.
In this paper, we plan to design more robust features to detect more Twitter spammers through in-depth analysis of the evasion tactics utilized by current Twitter spammers. To achieve our research goals, we collect and analyze around 500,000 Twitter accounts and more than 14 million tweets using Twitter API [18] , and identify around 2,000 Twitter spammers by using the blacklist and honeypot techniques. Then, we describe and validate current evasion tactics by both showing case studies and examining four existing state-of-the-art approaches on our collected dataset. Based on the in-depth analysis of those evasion 1556-6013/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE tactics, we design ten new features including graph-based features, neighbor-based features, timing-based features, and automation-based features to detect Twitter spammers. Through our evaluation experiments, we show that our newly designed features can be effectively used to detect Twitter spammers. In addition, to better understand the effectiveness and difficulties of using machine learning features to detect spammers, we also formalize the robustness of 24 detection features that are utilized in the existing work as well as our proposed ones.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present the first in-depth empirical analysis of evasion tactics utilized by current Twitter spammers based on a large dataset containing around 500,000 Twitter accounts and more than 14 million tweets.
• We evaluate the detection rates of four state-of-the-art solutions on our collected dataset. Even the best detector still misses detecting around a quarter of Twitter spammers and the worst detector could miss about 40% of the spammers.
• Based on our empirical analysis of Twitter spammers' malicious goals and evasion tactics, we propose and test our newly designed detection features. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work to propose neighbor-based detection features to detect Twitter spammers. According to our evaluation, while keeping an even lower false positive rate, the detection rate by using our new feature set significantly increases to 85%, much higher than that of existing detectors.
• We provide a new framework to formalize the robustness of 24 detection features that are utilized by the existing work and our work, and categorize them into 16 low-robustness features, 4 medium-robustness features and 4 high-robustness features.
II. RELATED WORK
Due to the rising popularity of Twitter, many studies have been conducted with an aim at studying the topological characteristics of Twitter. Kwa et al. [19] conducted a comprehensive, quantitative study of Twitter accounts' behavior, such as the distribution of the number of followers and followings for each account on the entire Twittersphere, and the reciprocity of these relationships. Cha et al. [9] designed diverse metrics to measure Twitter accounts.
Since spam and attacks are so rampant on online social networking sites, Koutrika et al. [20] proposed techniques to prevent attackers increasing the visibility of an object from fooling the search mechanism to detect tag spam in tagging systems. Benevenuto et al. [21] , [22] utilized machine learning techniques to identify video spammers in video social networks such as YouTube. Gao et al. [23] presented a study on detecting and characterizing social spam campaigns.
In terms of Twitter, there have been a few recently published studies on detecting Twitter spammers. Most existing detection work can be classified into two categories. The first category of work, such as [10] [11] [12] [13] [24] , detects spam accounts by examining whether the URLs or domains of the URLs posted in the tweets are tagged as malicious by the public URL/domain blacklists. Especially, to collect training data, both [10] and [13] utilized social honey accounts to attract Twitter spammers.
A recent study "Poultry Markets" [25] focuses on the analysis of those Twitter Account Markets, which could be used by spammers to increase their followers. This work essentially validates the phenomenon that spammers could use tricks to evade existing profile-based features. "Twitter Games" [26] focuses on analyzing how successful spammers pick targets to survive longer in Twitter by analyzing the relationships between spammers' social behaviors and their followers' social behaviors. Thomas et al. made a deep analysis of those suspended accounts [27] . Irani et al. proposed a user study on reverse social engineering attacks in social networks [28] . Chu et al. provided an approach on detecting spam campaigns that manipulate multiple accounts to spread spam on Twitter [29] .
Different from existing related work, motivated by our analysis that spammers have evolved to evade existing detection features by using different evasion techniques, our work focuses on designing more robust features with the considerations of both profile-based and content-based feature evasion techniques to detect those evasive spammers. In addition, to better understand the robustness of each detection feature, we also provide a new framework to qualitatively analyze the robustness of detection features. Thus, our work is a valuable supplement to existing Twitter spam detection research.
III. OVERVIEW
In this section, we state our targeted problems, and introduce our data collection strategies and results.
A. Problem Statement
As shown in Section II, most of existing studies on detecting Twitter spam accounts rely on machine learning techniques by designing detection features. However, the arms race nature between the attackers and defenders leads Twitter spammers to evolve or utilize tools to evade existing detection features [14] . Our research goal is to provide the first empirical analysis of the evasion tactics, and then through in-depth analysis of those evasion tactics, we propose new features to detect more Twitter spammers. In addition, to understand the strength of the detection features against evasion, we also analyze the robustness of the detection features.
B. Data Collection
In order to achieve our research goal, we need to create a large dataset by crawling real Twitter profiles and also identify Twitter spammers in this dataset. [18] . In order to decrease the effect of possible sampling bias [30] , our crawler recursively collects Twitter accounts in multiple rounds, with the consideration of guaranteeing sampling randomness and maintaining social relationships, rather than simply using the Breath First Search (BFS) sampling technique. More specifically, in each round, our crawler first collects 20 seed Twitter accounts from the public timeline, which are randomly selected by Twitter [31] . Then, the crawler will collect all of those seed accounts' followers and followings. This crawling process will be repeated in the next round. Also, for each account, our crawler collects its 40 most recent Tweets and the URLs in the tweets. Due to the large amount of redirection URLs used in Twitter, we also follow the URL redirection chain to obtain the final destination URL. This resulted in the collection of nearly 500,000 Twitter accounts which posted over 14 million tweets containing almost 6 million URLs (see Table I ).
In our work, we use a relatively strict strategy to collect Twitter spammers. More specifically, we focus on those Twitter spammers who post URLs linking to malicious content with an intention to compromise other users' computers or privacy, as mentioned in The Twitter Rules [8] . We target this type of spam accounts due to its prevalence on Twitter and the hazard it poses. Thus, unlike other related work (e.g., [10] ), we do not necessarily consider advertisers in Twitter as spammers, unless they post malicious content. To label Twitter spam accounts, we first utilize two methods to detect malicious or phishing URLs in the tweets: Google Safe Browsing (GSB) [32] and URL honeypot. GSB is a widely used and trustable blacklist to identify malicious/phishing URLs, which is fast but may miss labeling some malicious links. Thus, we also build a high-interaction client-side honeypot based on Capture-HPC [33] , which will be used to visit the URL using a real browser in a virtual machine. The honeypot detects a link as malicious, if the visit of the website can lead to the creation/modification of sensitive data (e.g., process, files and registries) in the virtual machine. We define a Tweet that contains at least one malicious or phishing URL as a Spam Tweet. In this way, we have collected 3,051 accounts that post at least one Spam Tweet by using GSB and 9,634 such accounts by using honeypot. For each account, we define its spam ratio as the ratio of the number of its spam tweets that we detect to the total number of its tweets that we collect. In this way, we have extracted 2,933 Twitter accounts with a spam ratio higher than 10%. In order to further decrease false positives, our group members spent several days on manually verifying those 2,933 accounts by viewing whether their tweets are useful and meaningful. Finally, we have obtained 2,060 identified spam accounts.
We admit that our data collection strategy might still incur some sampling bias. Also, due to practical limitations, we could only sample a portion of the whole Twittersphere. Thus, our dataset might not contain complete neighbor accounts' information for some collected accounts. However, it is a common challenge for all such line of work to collect a perfect and large-scale real-world OSN dataset with complete social relationships. Also, we believe that our major conclusions obtained by using our sample dataset could still hold, even though the values of some metrics measured (e.g., Graph-based Features proposed in Section V) in this study may vary by using different datasets. We will further discuss the limitations in Section VIII.
After collecting the data, we first make an in-depth analysis of the evasion tactics utilized by spammers through reproducing four state-of-the-art detection schemes and analyzing those missed spammers (false negatives) in Section IV. Then, according to those analysis, we design new and robust detection features to counter these tactics in Section V and formalize the robustness of the detection features in Section VI. Finally, in Section VII, we show that our newly designed features can be an effective supplement to the existing detection approaches.
IV. ANALYZING EVASION TACTICS
This section will describe the evasion tactics utilized by Twitter spammers to evade existing features for spammer detection. Then, we validate these tactics by both showing some case studies and examining this scenario on four state-of-the-art detection approaches based on our collected dataset.
A. Description of Evasion Tactics
The evasion tactics utilized by Twitter spammers can be mainly categorized into the following two types: profile-based feature evasion tactics and content-based feature evasion tactics.
1) Profile-Based Feature Evasion: A common intuition for discovering Twitter spam accounts can originate from accounts' basic profile information such as the number of followers and the number of tweets, because these indicators usually reflect Twitter accounts' reputation. To evade such profile-based detection features, spammers mainly utilize tactics including gaining more followers and posting more tweets.
Gaining More Followers: In general, the number of a Twitter account's followers reflects its popularity and credibility. A higher number of followers of an account commonly implies that more users trust this account and would like to receive the information from it. Thus, many profile-based detection features such as number of followers, fofo ratio and reputation score [12] . Fofo ratio is the ratio of the number of an account's followings to its followers, which are widely used in existing approaches [10] , [13] . Reputation score, which is the ratio of the number of an account's followers to the sum of its followers and followings, could be viewed as a variant of Fofo ratio. To evade these features or break Twitter's 2,000 Following Limit Policy 1 [34] , spammers can mainly adopt the following strategies to gain more followers. The first strategy is to purchase followers from some third-party websites, which charge a fee and then use an arsenal of Twitter accounts to follow their customers. The specific methods of providing these accounts may differ from site to site. The second strategy is to exchange followers with other users. This method is usually assisted by some third-party websites, which use existing customers' accounts to follow new customers' accounts. Since this method only requires Twitter accounts to follow several other accounts to gain more followers without any payment, Twitter spammers can get around the referral clause by creating more fraudulent accounts. In addition, Twitter spammers can gain followers for their accounts by using their own created fake accounts. Spammers will create a bunch of fake accounts to follow their spam accounts.
Posting More Tweets: Similar to the number of an account's followers, an account's tweet number usually reflects how much this account has contributed to the whole online social platform. A higher tweet number of an account usually implies that this account is more active and willing to share information with others. Thus, this feature is also widely used in the existing Twitter spammers detection approaches (e.g., [13] ). To evade this feature, spammers can post more Tweets to behave more like legitimate accounts, especially by utilizing particular public tweeting tools or software [35] .
2) Content-Based Feature Evasion: Another common indicator of spam accounts is the content of a suspect account's Tweets. As discussed in Section I, a lot of spam accounts make profits by luring legitimate users to click the malicious URLs posted in the spam tweets. Those malicious URLs can direct users to websites that may cause harm to their computers or scam them out of their money. Thus, the percentage of Tweets containing URLs is an effective indicator of spam accounts, which is utilized in work such as [10] , [13] , [12] . In addition, since many spammers repeat posting the same or similar malicious tweets in order to increase the probability of successfully alluring legitimate users' visits, especially with the help of some automated tweeting tools, their published tweets show strong homogeneous characteristics. In this way, many existing approaches design content-based features such as tweet similarity [10] , [13] and duplicate tweet count [12] to detect spam accounts. To evade such content-based detection features, spammers mainly utilize the tactics of mixing normal tweets and posting heterogeneous tweets.
Mixing Normal Tweets: Spammers can utilize this tactic to evade content-based features such as URL ratio, unique URL ratio, hashtag ratio [10] , [12] . These normal tweets without malicious URLs may be handcrafted or obtained from arbitrary users' tweets or consist of totally meaningless words. By mixing such normal tweets, spam accounts are able to dilute their spam tweets and make it more difficult for a detector to distinguish them from legitimate accounts.
Posting Heterogeneous Tweets: Spammers can post heterogeneous tweets to evade content-based features such as tweet similarity and duplicate tweet count. Specifically, spammers post tweets with the same semantic meaning but with different terms. In this way, not only can the spammers maintain the same semantic meanings to allure victims, but also they can make their tweets variational enough to not be caught by detectors that rely on such content-based features. In fact, many public tools, e.g., Spinbot [16] , can help spammers to spin spam tweets into hundreds of variable tweets with the same semantic meaning but different words.
B. Validation of Evasion Tactics
In this section, we aim at validating those evasion tactics described in the previous section by first showing real case studies and public services/tools that can be utilized by the spammers. Then, to further validate such tactics on our collected dataset, we also reproduce existing detection schemes [10] , [13] , [12] , [11] and evaluate them on our collected examination dataset. (To better explain our result, we label the work of [10] as , [13] as , [12] as , and [11] as .) Rather than accurately finding out all evasive accounts in our dataset (because it is difficult or even impossible to obtain such a ground truth on a large scale dataset), we focus on analyzing those missed spammers (false negatives) in the existing approaches. Through analyzing the reason why those spammers are missed by existing approaches, we validate that those spammers have indeed evolved to behave similar as legitimate accounts to evade existing detection features.
Gaining More Followers: As described in Section IV-A, spammers can gain more followers by purchasing them, exchanging them and creating fake accounts. In fact, several public websites allow for direct purchase of followers, even though the rates per follower in each website may vary, as seen in Table II .
Also, Fig. 1(a) shows a real online website, from which users can directly purchase followers at a very cheap price. The website also claims that users can buy targeted followers with specific keywords in their tweets at a much higher price. As seen in Fig. 1(b) , Twitter followers can even be directly purchased through the famous and widely used online bidding website-eBay. Besides purchasing followers, Twitter spammers can also increase their followers by exchanging followers with other users. Fig. 1(c) shows a real online website from which users can increase their followers through obtaining seeds by following other accounts.
After showing these online services through which spammers can obtain more followers, we examine two widely used detection features of number of followers and fofo ratio on those four existing work [10] , [13] , [12] , [11] based on our collected dataset. In particular, we draw the distributions of these two metrics of three sets of accounts: missed spammers (false negatives) in each of four existing approaches, all accounts (around 500 collected accounts), and all spammers (2,060 identified spammers). From Fig. 2(a) and (b), we can see that the distributions of these two indicators of those missed spammers by the existing approaches are more similar to that of all accounts than that of all spammers. This observation shows that many spammers pretend to be more legitimate by gaining more followers.
Posting More Tweets: Besides using Web to post tweets, spammers can utilize tools such as AutoTwitter [35] and Twitter API [18] to automatically post more tweets. Fig. 2(c) shows the distributions of the numbers of tweets of the missed spammers in each of three existing approaches, all spammers and all accounts. From this figure, we can find that missed spammers (false negatives) post much more tweets than all spammers, even though the tweet numbers of all spammers are much lower than that of all accounts. This observation also implies that spammers are trying to post more tweets to not to be recognized as spammers.
Mixing Normal Tweets: Based on observations of the missed spammers by the existing work, we can find that some of them post nonspam tweets to dilute their spam tweet percentage. Fig. 3(a) shows a real example of a spammer that posts famous quotes, "Winning isn't everything, but wanting to win is-Vince Lombardi", between tweets containing links to phishing and scam websites.
Posting Heterogeneous Tweets: To avoid detection features such as tweet similarity and duplicate tweet count, spammers could use tools to post heterogeneous tweets with the same semantic meaning but with different words. Fig. 3(b) shows a spammer that posts various messages encouraging users to sign up for a service that is eventually a trap to steal users' e-mail addresses. Notice that the spammer uses three different phrases that have the same semantic meaning: "I will get more. You can too!", "you will get more.", and "want get more, you need to check". One example of such tools that can be used to automatically create heterogeneous tweets, called Spin Bot, is shown in Fig. 3(c) . By typing a phrase into the large text field and pressing "Process Text", a new phrase with the same semantic meaning yet different words is generated in the small text field below.
From the above analysis and validation, we can find that Twitter spam accounts are indeed evolving to evade existing detection methods to increase their lifespan. After analyzing these evasive tactics utilized by spammers, we next design new features as a complement to existing ones, which make spammers more difficult to evade detection.
V. DESIGNING NEW FEATURES
In this section, to counter spammers' evasion tactics, we propose several new and more robust detection features. A robust feature should either be difficult or expensive for the malicious entity to evade: a feature is difficult to evade if it requires a fundamental change in the way a malicious entity performs its malicious deeds; a feature is expensive to evade if the evasion requires significant money, time or resources. On the basis of spammers' special characteristics, we design 10 new detection features including 3 Graph-based features, 3 Neighbor-based features, 3 Automation-based features and 1 Timing-based feature, which will be described in detail in the following sections.
More specifically, graph-based features and neighbor-based features are mainly designed to catch those spammers who attempt to evade profile-based features by controlling their own social behaviors (e.g., increasing the number of followers or tweets). The intuition is that even though spammers could change their own social behaviors, it is still very difficult for them to change the social behaviors of the majority of their (benign) following/follower accounts, i.e., spammers typically could not force their followings or followers to follow specific accounts or to post specific tweets. Thus, the values of those graph-based and neighbor-based features could be used to distinguish spammers from normal accounts. In addition, automation-based and timing-based features are mainly designed to catch those spammers who attempt to evade content-based features by adding more benign tweets. The intuition is that even though spammers could insert normal tweets, they typically still need to use customized tools or software to automatically post a considerable number of malicious tweets with malicious URLs to trap victims more effectively. Thus, those automated social behaviors of spam accounts could still indicate the differences between themselves and normal accounts.
A. Graph-Based Features
If we view each Twitter account as a node and each follow relationship as a directed edge , then we can view the whole Twittersphere as a directed graph . Even though the spammers can change their tweeting or following behavior, it will be difficult for them to change their positions in this graph. According to this intuition, we design three graph-based features: local clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, and bidirectional links ratio.
Local Clustering Coefficient of a vertex is the proportion of links between the vertices within its neighborhood divided by the number of links that could possibly exist between them [36]. This metric can be utilized to quantify how close a vertex's neighbors are to being a clique. For each vertex in the Twitter graph, its local clustering score can be computed with (1), where is the sum of the indegree and outdegree of the vertex , and is the total number of edges built by all 's neighbors.
Since legitimate users usually follow accounts whose owners are their friends, colleagues or family members, these accounts are likely to have a relationship with each other. However, since spammers usually blindly follow other accounts, these accounts usually do not know each other and have a looser relationship among them. Thus, compared with the legitimate accounts, Twitter spammers will have smaller local clustering coefficients. This intuition can be illustrated in Fig. 4(a) and (b) .
Compared with spam accounts, the stronger social relationships among normal accounts intend to will form more triangles. In our implementation, to calculate the local clustering coefficient for each account, we first collect its followers as neighbors. Thus, we could build a small social graph based on this account and its followers. Then, its local clustering coefficient could be calculated based on examining how complete this small social graph is.
Betweenness Centrality is a centrality measure of a vertex within a graph [37] . Vertices that occur on many shortest paths between other vertices have a higher betweenness than those that do not. In a directed graph, betweeness centrality of each vertex can be computed with (2), where is the number of shortest paths from to , and is the number of shortest paths from to that pass through a vertex , and is the total number of vertexes in the graph. (2) This metric reflects the position of the vertex in the graph. Nodes that occur in many shortest paths have higher values of betweenness centrality. A Twitter spammer will typically use a shotgun approach to finding victims, which means it will randomly follow many unrelated accounts. As a result, when the Twitter spammer follows these unrelated accounts, the spammer creates a new shortest path between those accounts through the spam account. Thus, the betweenness centrality of the spammer will be high. This intuition can be illustrated in Fig. 5(a) and (b) . Compared with normal accounts, spammer accounts' randomly following policy essentially create more shortest paths between their following accounts passing through them.
An informed spammer would be able to carefully choose the accounts to follow and force their betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient values to be similar to those of a normal Twitter user. However, this not only requires more time, skills and money to implement, but also limits the number of potential victims of spammers.
Bidirectional Links Ratio: If two accounts follow each other, we consider there is a bidirectional link between them. The number of bidirectional links of an account reflects the reciprocity between an account and its followings. Since Twitter spammers usually follow a large number of legitimate accounts and cannot force those legitimate accounts to follow back, the number of bidirectional links that a spammer has is low. On the other hand, a legitimate user is likely to follow his/her friends, family members, or coworkers who will follow this user back. Thus, this indication can be used to distinguish spammers. However, Twitter spammers could evade this by following back their followers. Thus, we create another feature named bidirectional links ratio , which can be computed with (3).
where and denote the number of bidirectional links and the number of followings.
The intuition behind this feature can be illustrated in Fig. 6 (a) and (b). Since it is very difficult for spammers to force their following accounts to follow them back, compared with their high values of , their values of will be relatively difficult to increase. Thus, compared with normal accounts, spammers intend to have much smaller values of bidirectional link ratios. To validate such an intuition, we compare the values of bidirectional links ratio in all our collected accounts and our identified spam accounts. As seen in Fig. 7 , spammer accounts tend to have smaller values of bidirectional links ratio. In particular, around 70% of spammers' values are less than 0.2, while only around 50% of all accounts' values are less than 0.2.
We acknowledge that spammers could try to change the values of these graph features by building fake social relationships with other spam accounts. However, this strategy could still be difficult to significantly impact the global graph features. In addition, by doing this kind of evasion, the efficiency of spammers to trap victims will be greatly reduced (see more information in Section VI). Furthermore, if spammer accounts tend to follow with each other, they could be identified by existing sybil-attack detection approaches (e.g., SybilGuard [38] ) or relationship analysis approaches (e.g., [39] ).
B. Neighbor-Based Features
Due to the fact that spammers can control their own behavior but can not control their following accounts' behavior, in this section, we design three neighbor-based features to distinguish Twitter spammers and legitimate accounts: average neighbors' followers, average neighbors' tweets, and followings to median neighbors' followers.
Average Neighbors' Followers: Average neighbors' followers, denoted as , of an account represents the average number of followers of this account's followings, which can be computed with (4) . (4) where and denote the number of followers and followings, respectively. Since an account's follower number usually reflects this account's popularity or reputation, this feature reflects the quality of the choice of friends of an account. It is obvious that legitimate accounts intend to follow carefully selected accounts that typically have higher quality unlike the spammers typically do blind/random following. Thus, the average neighbors' followers of legitimate accounts are commonly higher than that of spammers.
Average Neighbors' Tweets: Similar to the average neighbors' followers, since an account's tweet number could also reflect this account's quality, we design another feature, named average neighbors' tweets, which is the average number of tweets of this account's following accounts. Note that these two features can be evaded by following popular Twitter accounts (seen in Section 6). Thus, we also design another more robust neighbor-based detection feature, named followings to median neighbors' followers.
Followings to Median Neighbors' Followers: To extract this feature, we first calculate the median number of an account's all following accounts' follower numbers, denoted as . Then, the value of the followings to median neighbors' followers of an account, denoted as , can be computed as the ratio of this account's following number to that median number, as shown in (5).
(5)
Since the spammers can not guarantee the quality of the accounts they follow, their values of are typically small. Thus, due to spammers' large numbers of followings, spammers' values of will be also high. For legitimate accounts, to show the analysis of this feature, we divide them into two different types: common accounts (legitimate accounts without large numbers of followers) and popular accounts (legitimate accounts with large numbers of followers). For the first type of accounts, they may also just follow their friends, leading to a small value of . However, since their following numbers are also not high, common accounts' values of are not high. For the popular accounts who are usually celebrities, famous politicians, or professional institutions, they will usually choose accounts that are also popular to follow. In this way, these accounts' values of will be high, leading to low values of . From the above analysis, we can find that spammers will have higher values of this feature than that of legitimate accounts. In addition, since we use the median value rather than the mean, it will be very difficult for spammers to increase their values of by following a few very popular accounts. Thus, this feature is more difficult to be evaded.
C. Automation-Based Features
Due to the high cost of manually managing a large number of spam accounts, many spammers choose to create a custom program using Twitter API to post spam tweets. Thus, we also design three automation-based features to detect spammers: API 2 Ratio, API URL Ratio and API Tweet Similarity.
API Ratio is the ratio of the number of tweets with the tweet source as "API" to the total number of tweets. As existing work [41] shows, many bots use API to post tweets, so a higher API ratio implies this account is more suspicious.
API URL Ratio is the ratio of the number of tweets containing a URL posted by API to the total number of tweets posted by API. It is more convenient for spammers to post spam tweets using API, especially when spammers need to manage a large amount of accounts, as discussed in Section IV. Thus, a higher API URL ratio of an account implies that this account's tweets sent from API are more likely to contain URLs, making this account more suspicious.
API Tweet Similarity: Spammers can use tricks to evade the detection feature of tweet similarity as described in Section IV and still choose to use API to automatically post malicious tweets. Thus, we also design API tweet similarity, which only compute the similarity of those tweets posted by API. Thus, a higher API tweet similarity of an account implies that this account is more suspicious.
D. Timing-Based Features
Similar to other timing-based features such as tweeting rate presented in [11] , we design another feature named following rate.
Following Rate reflects the speed at which an account follows other accounts. Since spammers usually follow many users in a short period of time, a high following rate of an account indicates that the account is likely a spam account. Since it is diffi-cult to collect the time when an account follows another account, we use an approximation to calculate this feature. Specifically, we use the ratio of an account's following number to the age of the account at the time the following number was recorded. Note that this feature can still be evaded with cost and we use the approximate method to calculate this feature due to practical constraints. We analyze its robustness in Section VI, and discuss its limitation in Section VIII.
After designing these new features, we first formalize the robustness of most of the existing detection features and our designed features in Section VI. Then, we combine some existing effective features and our features to build a new machine learning detection scheme and evaluate it based on our dataset in Section VII.
VI. FORMALIZING FEATURE ROBUSTNESS
In this section, in order to analyze how to design effective features to detect Twitter spammers along with their evolutions, we formalize the robustness of those detection features.
A. Formalizing the Robustness
Before analyzing the robustness of each feature in detail, we first build a model to define the robustness of the detection features. Due to the dual-purpose nature of spammers-avoiding detection and achieving malicious goals, the robustness of each feature , denoted as , can be viewed as the tradeoff between the spammers' cost to avoid the detection and the profits by achieving malicious goals. Thus, the robustness of each feature can be computed with (6) . (6) Then, if the cost of evading the detection feature is much higher than the profits, this feature is relatively robust. To quantify the evasion, we use to denote the threshold for spammers to evade each detection feature .
From the viewpoints of Twitter spammers, the cost to evade the detection mainly includes money cost, operation cost and time cost. The money cost is mainly related to obtaining followers. We use to denote the cost for the spammer to obtain one follower. The operation cost is mainly related to posting tweets or following specific accounts. We use and to denote the cost for a spammer to post one tweet or follow one specific account. And spammers' profits are achieved by attracting legitimate accounts' attention. Thus, Twitter spammers' profits can be measured by the number of followings that they can support and the number of spam tweets that they can post. And we use and to denote the profit of supporting one following account, obtaining one following back and posting one spam tweet, respectively. Let and denote the number of accounts that a spammer desires to follow and the number of malicious tweets that the spammer desires to post.
In this section, we show our analysis of the robustness for the following 6 categories of features: profile-based features, content-based features, graph-based features, neighbor-based features, timing-based features and automation-based features. The Table III 3 . (Similar to Section IV, we also label the work of [10] as , [13] as , [12] as , and [11] as .)
B. Robustness of Profile-Based Features
As described in Section IV, spammers usually evade this type of detection features by obtaining more followers. According to (6) , the robustness of the detection feature fofo ratio , which is a representative feature of this type, can be computed with (7). (7) From Table II, we can find that can be very cheap, which could be much smaller compared with the . Even when the spammers who desire to follow 2,000 accounts, which is restricted by the Twitter's 2,000 Following Limit Policy [34] , they just need to spend $50 to bypass that policy. Thus, this feature can be evaded by spending little money. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the features and . For feature , since the age of an account is determined by the time when the account is created, which can not be changed or modified by the spammers, this feature is relatively hard to evade. (Obviously, it is also possible to evade if the spammers can use some tricks to obtain the Twitter accounts that were registered in Twitter a long time ago. However, unlike obtaining followers, obtaining a specific Twitter account will be very expensive. For example, the bid value of purchasing a Twitter account that steadily has over 1,390 followers is $1,550 [42] .)
Since number of tweets is related to several contentbased features, we show the analysis of shortly.
C. Robustness of Content-Based Features
As shown in Table III , content-based features can be divided into two types: signature-based features ( and ) based on special terms or tags in the tweets and similarity-based features ( , and ) based on the similarity among the tweets. As discussed in Section IV, both types of features can be evaded by automatically posting nonsignature tweets or diverse tweets. Also, by using these tactics, the spammers can evade the feature of the number of tweets . Without the loss of generality, we analyze robustness of the URL_ratio to represent the analysis of this type of features. Similar to Eq. (7), if a spammer needs to post tweets with malicious URLs, the robustness for can be computed with Eq. (8) . (8) From Eq. (8), we can find that if spammers utilize software such as AutoTwitter [35] and Twitter API [18] to automatically post tweets, will be small. So even when we set a small value of (e.g., 0.1), compared with the big profits of successfully alluring the victims to click the malicious URLs, the cost is still small.
D. Robustness of Graph-Based Features
For the graph-based features, we can divide them into two types: reciprocity-based features ( and ) based on the number of the bidirectional links and position-based features ( and ) based on the position in the graph. If we denote as the cost to obtain one bidirectional link, then the robustness of and can be computed with Eq. (9) and (10).
Since attackers could not achieve obvious profit (e.g., sending more tweets or obtaining more followers to garner victims) by obtaining more bidirectional links to evade reciprocity-based features, we mainly consider their cost rather than profit.
Since it is impractical to set a high bidirectional link threshold to distinguish legitimate accounts and spammers, the value of could not be set high. Meanwhile, when is small, spammers can obtain bidirectional links by following back their followers. Thus, the is neither high. Thus, from Eq. (9), we can find that the value of is not high. In terms of feature , since the average of the bidirectional links ratio is 22.1% [19] and spammers usually have a large value of , spammers need to obtain much more bidirectional links to show a normal bidirectional links ratio. Even though spammers could try to increase by following back their followers, due to the big number of their following accounts and the difficulties of forcing those accounts to follow spammers back, it will cost a lot for spammers to evade this feature.
For the position-based features, since spammers usually blindly follow legitimate accounts, which may not follow those spammers back, it will be difficult for spammers to change their positions in the whole social network graph. Similarly, spammers can hardly control the benign accounts they have followed to build social links with each other. In this way, it is difficult for spammers to change their values of the graph metrics, thus to evade graph-based features.
E. Robustness of Neighbor-Based Features
The first two neighbor-based features reflect the quality of an account's friend choice, which has been discussed in Section V. If we use to denote the number of popular accounts (the accounts that have very big follower numbers) that a spammer needs to follow to get a high enough to evade feature , then the robustness of can be computed with Eq. (11).
Since there are many popular accounts with a lot of followers, and could be small. Thus, as long as the spammers know about this detection feature, they can evade it easily. Similar results can be gained for feature . However, for feature , since we use the median not the mean of the neighbors' followers, they need to follow around half of popular accounts to evade this feature. With a consideration of spammers' big values of , the cost will be very high and the profit will be decreased dramatically for the spammers to evade this feature. So, feature is relatively difficult to evade.
F. Robustness of Timing-Based Features
The timing-based features are related to spammers' update behavior. Although the profits may drop when spammers decrease their following or tweeting rate, the cost can still be low because these two features can be totally controlled by the spammers. Thus, feature and are relatively easy to evade.
G. Robustness of Automation-Based Features
As discussed in Section V, in order to more efficiently achieve the malicious goals, many Twitter spammers will control multiple spam accounts to spread the spam tweets. Similar to the discussion of content-based features, if the spammers want to evade automation-based features, they may also need to use software to manage those spam accounts to automatically post tweets. Due to the simplicity and convenience of using API, most spammers use API to post tweets.
If we use and to denote the cost of using Web and API to post one tweet, it is obvious that if the spammers desire to post a large amount of tweets, the cost of posting by Web will be much higher than that of using API, (i.e.,
). If a spammer desires to use API to post spam tweets on spam accounts, then the robustness of feature can be computed with Eq. (12), shown at the bottom of the page.
Since few legitimate accounts would use API to post tweets, can be set as very small. In this way, since , if a spammer wants to control many spammer accounts and post a large amount of tweets, the cost will be relatively high. The conclusions for the rest of this type of features are similar.
Only using feature will bring some false positives, because legitimate accounts may also use API to post tweets. However, if we combine the features of , and together, it will decrease those false positives, because few legitimate accounts would use API to post very similar tweets with URLs as spammers do.
In summary, through the above analysis, we can categorize the robustness of these detection features into the following three scales: low, medium, and high. The summary of this information can be seen in Table III .
Note that the model presented above serves as the first attempt to analyze the robustness of detection features. Although more statistically quantitative analysis based on the usage of real-world data could make the model to be more persuasive, it essentially requires the answers of many research questions. For example, how to accurately and quantitatively measure OSN spammers economic profit? How to measure the cost of losing an effective spam account for spammers? What specific behaviors (accurate values in Twitters suspension rules) will make accounts suspended by Twitter? To answer such questions, more (12) research efforts of analyzing OSN spammers' economic chain and OSNs anti-spam measures are needed, which are out of the scope of this study. We hope this study could stimulate more future research in this direction.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of our machine learning feature set including 8 existing effective features marked with and 10 newly designed features marked with in Table III . We evaluate the feature set by implementing machine learning techniques on two different datasets: Dataset I and Dataset II. Dataset I consists of 20,000 accounts without any spam tweets, which are randomly selected from our crawled 500 accounts described in Section III-B, and all 2,060 identified spammer accounts. To decrease the effects of sampling bias and show the quality of our detection feature schema without using URL analysis as the ground truth, we also crawled another 35,000 Twitter accounts and randomly selected 3,500 accounts to build another dataset, denoted as Dataset II.
A. Evaluation on Dataset I
In this section, based on Dataset I, we evaluate our machine learning feature set including performance comparison, feature validation, learning curve, Feature Rank, and Varying Spam Account Prior Probability.
Performance Comparison: In this experiment, we compare the performance of our work with four existing approaches 4 :
[10] using 10 features, [13] using 6 features, [12] using 7 features and [11] using 62 features. (Similar as before, to better show the results, we label the work [10] as , [13] as , [12] as , [11] as , and our work as .) We conduct our evaluation by using four different machine learning classifiers: Random Forest (RF), Decision Tree (DT), Bayes Net (BN) and Decorate (DE) . For each machine learning classifier, we use the method of ten-fold cross validation to compute three performance metrics: False Positive Rate, Detection Rate, and F-1 measure. 5 As seen in Fig. 8 , our approach outperforms all existing work. Specifically, from Fig. 8(a) , we can find that the false positive rates of our work under all four machine learning classifiers are the lowest and can be steadily maintained under 1%. Especially, under the Random Forest classifier (RF), the false positive rate of our work is only 0.4%, while this rate is 0.6% for the best detector in existing work (RF of ) and 1% for the second best detector (RF of ). From Fig. 8(b) , we can see that the detection rates of our work under all four machine learning classifiers are also the highest. In particular, the highest detection rate of our work among these four classifiers is 85.4%, and the lowest detection rate of our work is around 84%. As a comparison, the detection rate is only 61% for the worst detector in existing work (DE in ), and 78% for the best existing detector (RF in ), although utilizes significantly more features than us (over 60 features used in ). Fig. 8 (c) also shows that under all four classifiers, F-measure scores of our approach are the highest. The above results validate that our new feature set is more effective to detect Twitter spammers.
Through these three figures, we can also observe that the performance of [10] , [13] and [11] is better than that of [12] . That is mainly because all these three studies utilize content-based feature such as tweet similarity and spam word ratio. However, [12] only uses the feature of duplicate tweet count, which may has been widely evaded by spammers. Also, [11] utilizes various timing-based and content-based features leading its performance to be better than that of [10] and [13] .
Feature Validation: To further validate that the improved performance results of our work is indeed due to our designed features rather than the simple combination of multiple existing features, we also implement another experiment to compare the performance of two feature sets-without and with using our new features. Specifically, the first one consists of 8 existing features used in the previous experiment. The second one further adds our new features. Table IV shows that for each classifier, with the addition of our newly designed features, the detection rate (DR) increases over 10%, while maintaining an even lower false positive rate (FPR). This observation validates that the improvement of the detection performance is indeed due to our newly designed features.
Learning Curve: In this experiment, we show the steadiness of our feature set by varying the training ratio, which is the ratio of the number of training data to the number of testing data. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of False Positive Rate, Detection Rate, and Accuracy for our work using five different training ratios (1:1, 3:1, 5:1, 7:1, 9:1). As Fig. 9(a) shows, even when the training ratio varies, our approach can obtain a low false positive rate, never rising above 0.5%. Fig. 9(b) shows that our approach can steadily detect over 82% spammers under different training ratios. From Fig. 9(c) , we can see that the total accuracy can remain higher than 98%, even when the training ratio is small (e.g., 1:1).
Feature Rank: To show the effectiveness of the features in our feature set, we use three prevalent feature evaluation methods: Information Gain, Chi-Square test and AUC (Area Under the ROC Curve). For each method, we compute the ranks of the detection features that we used (seen in Table V) . The results show that our new designed features are effective to detect Twitter spam accounts. In particular, our designed automation-based features (API ratio and API URL ratio) are highly ranked in all three different methods. In addition, our newly designed graph-based features (e.g., average neighbors' tweets) are also very effective in discovering spammers. It is worth noting that the ranks of features in this table do not have any relationships to their robustness. That is, although some features (e.g., fofo ratio) are still effective to distinguish most current spammers (i.e., they still have good ranks in the table), they could be easily evaded by spammers, leading to low robustness. On the other hand, although some of our new features do not necessarily have very high ranks in the table, they can contribute to the detection of very evasive spammer accounts, as already demonstrated previously.
Varying Spam Account Prior Probability: In this experiment, we also evaluate the performance of our work on different datasets with different spam account prior probabilities. Specifically, for each dataset, we use the same 2,000 identified spam accounts which are randomly sampled from Dataset I. Then, we adjust the ratio of the number of spam to normal accounts on different datasets to tailor the performance, where a larger ratio indicates a stronger tendency to classify a account as a spam account. We evaluate the performance of False Positive Rate, Detection Rate, and Accuracy on four different datasets with four ratios (1:1, 1:2, 1:5, 1:10). The result can be seen in Table VI . This result shows that our approach could achieve a relatively high accuracy score (F-1 measure higher than 0.89) in all four different datasets.
B. Evaluation on Dataset II
In this section, to decrease possible effect of sampling bias, we evaluate the effectiveness of our detection feature set by testing it on another new dataset containing 3,500 unclassified Twitter accounts, which are randomly selected from Twitter. Our goal of the evaluation on another crawled dataset is to test the actual operation and user experience without the ground truth from URL analysis. Due to the lack of the ground truth on this dataset, we do not know the exact number of spam accounts. Thus, we evaluate our approach by computing the Bayesian detection rate [44] -the probability of actually being a spammer, whenever an account is reported as a spammer account by the detection system. Specifically, we use Dataset I as the training dataset, and Dataset II as the testing data. Then, based on our detection feature set, we use BayesNet classifier to predict spammers on Dataset II. Finally, the classifier reported 70 spammers. Through the manual investigation of those 70 spammers, we found 37 accounts post spam and 25 accounts are suspicious promotional advertisers. In this case, we have a high Bayesian detection rate of 88.6% (62/70). Then, we further investigate the other 8 false positives. We find that all of them have odd behaviors, but have not posted malicious content. Specifically, 6 of them are actively and repeatedly tweeting the same topic. The other 2 have posted very few tweets, yet have a large number of followings with a high ratio of followings to followers.
VIII. LIMITATION AND FUTURE WORK
Due to practical constraints, we can only crawl a portion of the whole Twittersphere and our crawled dataset may still have sampling bias. However, collecting an ideal large dataset from Twitter, a large and dynamic real-world OSN, without any bias is almost a mission impossible.
In addition, it is well acknowledged in the community that it is challenging (or impossible) to achieve a comprehensive ground truth for Twitter spammers. Also, in order to guarantee that our collected spammers are real spammers, we use a more strict strategy than what used in most of other related work to collect our spammers. Thus, the number of our identified spammers is only a lower bound, and the percentage of identified spammers in our dataset may be smaller than that reported in other studies. However, even for a subset of spammers, we can see that they are evolving to evade detection. And our evaluation validates the effectiveness of our newly designed features to detect these evasive spammers. We also acknowledge that some identified spam accounts may be compromised accounts. However, since these accounts still behave fairly maliciously in their recent histories, it is meaningful to detect them.
We clearly admit that those 20K accounts used as our benign dataset may still contain some spam accounts. However, it is very difficult to obtain a perfect ground truth from such a big dataset. Thus, we only collect those accounts without posting malicious URLs to build the benign dataset. Also, we believe that our major conclusion could still be held, although there could be some noisy items in the training dataset.
While graph-based features such as local clustering coefficient and betweenness centrality are relatively difficult to evade, these features are also expensive to extract. Also, precisely calculating the values of such graph metrics on large graphs (e.g., the whole Twitter graph) is very challenging and a hot research issue, which is out of scope of this work. However, we could still estimate the values of these two features by using a neighborsampling technique that allows us to compute these metrics piece-by-piece. Also, since we can not extract the exact time when an account follows another, we use an approximation to calculate the feature of following rate. Even though this feature may be not perfectly accurate, an approximate value of this feature can still reflect how radically an account increases its following number.
For future work, we plan to design more robust features, evaluate our machine learning detection scheme on larger datasets by using more crawling strategies, and work directly with Twitter. We also plan to broaden our targeted type of spammers, so that we can perform a deeper analysis on the evasion tactics by different types of spammers. We also plan to make more quantitative models for the analysis of the robustness of the detection features by deeper analyzing the envision tactics. In addition, further studies on analyzing the correlation among different features and designing better machine learning classifiers by selecting more effective features are also in our future plan.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design new and more robust features to detect Twitter spammers based on an in-depth analysis of the evasion tactics utilized by Twitter spammers. Through the analysis of those evasion tactics and the examination of four state-of-the-art solutions, we design several new features. In addition, in terms of spammers' dual objectives-staying alive and achieving malicious goals, we also formalize the robustness of detection features for the first time in the literature. Finally, according to our evaluation, while keeping an even lower false positive rate, the detection rate by using our new feature set is also much higher than all existing detectors under four different prevalent machine learning classifiers. To promote further research in this area, we have also released some of our datasets. 6 
